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Abstract:

In a recent issue of this journal, I published an article proposing the concept of winter-safe deterrence. The article defined winter-safe deterrence as “military force capable of meeting the deterrence goals of today’s nuclear weapon states without risking catastrophic nuclear winter”. The article and a summary version published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists have since stimulated extensive discussion in social media, the Bulletin, and now a symposium in this journal. The discussion has been productive for refining certain aspects of winter-safe deterrence and getting an initial sense of how the concept may be received. This is exactly what should happen for a new idea with significant policy implications. As a humble author, I welcome the discussion, including the points of criticism. I likewise thank the participants in this symposium for their contributions, as well as the many others who have commented elsewhere on winter-safe deterrence. In this essay, I reply to the contributions to this symposium as part of a broader discussion of winter-safe deterrence and the discussion it has sparked.

Academic citation:
Seth D. Baum, 2015. Winter-safe deterrence as a practical contribution to reducing nuclear winter risk: A reply. Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 36, no. 2 (August), pages 387-397, DOI 10.1080/13523260.2015.1054101.

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Image credit: United States Office of War Information


This blog post was published on 28 July 2020 as part of a website overhaul and backdated to reflect the time of the publication of the work referenced here.